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P, the appellant, appealed against his conviction for murder on two grounds. The first ground 
of appeal (to which this case note relates) was that evidence of P’s bad character had been 
wrongly admitted for P’s co-defendant, M. The second ground of appeal (which is not further 
considered in this case note) concerned the admission of psychiatric evidence relating to M’s 
mental state.  
The allegations against P and M related to the murder of V, the victim. All three lived in a 
guest house in which ex-offenders were housed. When fire officers attended a fire at the guest 
house they found V’s dead body which was still alight. V had received multiple injuries to his 
face and there was a ligature around his neck but his death had been caused by carbon 
monoxide poisoning.  The prosecution case against P alleged that P had attacked V, inflicted 
serious injuries on V and then set V on fire because V had refused to give P his post office 
card and PIN. The prosecution case against M (alleging a joint attack by P and M) depended 
upon establishing its case against P. M asserted that he had not been involved in V’s murder 
and ran a cut throat defence against P. P did not positively assert that M had murdered V but 
placed P in a group of three residents who might have done so.  
P had numerous previous convictions including convictions for dishonesty offences and  for 
possessing offensive weapons. In particular, twenty three years earlier, when P was 15 years 
old, he had been convicted of arson and P also had two convictions for causing grievous 
bodily harm (from 1995 and 2003). The prosecution did not apply to adduce evidence of P’s 
previous convictions but M applied to adduce evidence of them under s.101(1)(e) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. The judge admitted evidence of the latter three convictions under 
s.101(1)(e) as evidence of P’s propensity to be untruthful because P had implicitly put M’s 
credibility in issue and had put M in a group of three residents who might have murdered V. 
She held that the matters in issue between P and M were factual disputes concerning their 
respective locations in the guest house at the material time and the credibility of P and M and 
that the three convictions had substantial probative value. In reaching her decision the judge 
relied upon the decision at common law of the House of Lords in Randall [2004] 1 WLR 
1413. Following the judge’s decision to admit evidence of P’s three convictions, P then 
applied for and was granted permission to adduce evidence of M’s convictions and those of 
the two other residents referred to above, which resulted in the judge then admitting evidence 
of P’s dishonesty convictions.  
On appeal, P, submitted that the arson conviction could only be admissible if it had 
substantial probative value in relation to propensity to arson and that the two convictions for 
causing grievous bodily harm could only be admissible if they had substantial probative value 
in relation to propensity to violence. P, however, highlighted the time intervals between the 
convictions and the murder,  the fact that the circumstances of the arson were very different 
to those of the murder and the fact that the nature of the two convictions for causing grievous 
bodily harm was different to that of the murder. P asserted that the convictions could not be 
relevant to credibility; the very ground upon which the judge had admitted them. P also 
asserted that the judge had relied on a common law decision (Randall) but that s.99 of the 
2003 Act had abolished the relevant common law principles.  
Held, in dismissing the appeal,  
The judge had been bound to determine the admissibility of P’s convictions under s.101(1)(e) 
of the 2003 Act, which had abolished the common law principles in Randall.  Whilst the 
common law principles were set out in Archbold, they were not relevant to admissibility 
under the 2003 Act. The sole test applied should be that in s.101(1)(e) and this was especially 
important because (unlike the position where evidence of bad character is tendered by the 
prosecution under s.101(1)(d)), where evidence of bad character is admissible under 
s.101(1)(e) the court does not possess discretion to exclude it. The substantial probative value 
test in s.101(1)(e) is a higher test than the test of relevance in s.101(1)(d). Section 104(1) 
(which relates to propensity to untruthfulness or credibility under s.101(1)(e)) had not been 
applicable because the admissibility of P’s three convictions could not have been based on 
substantial probative value in relation to credibility. Consequently, the two questions for the 
court were whether the evidence had substantial probative value and whether the matter in 
relation to which it had substantial probative value was of substantial importance in the 
context of the case as a whole. The word substantial was an ordinary word which required no 
gloss but should be given its ordinary meaning. It was neither necessary nor desirable to refer 
to the common law concerning the admissibility of evidence of bad character that the 2003 
Act had abolished and the time might well have come to remove references to it from 
textbooks. If the judge had solely concentrated on the two questions referred to above she 
would have concluded that they were not of substantial probative value in relation to 
propensity. The judge’s directions to the jury had, however, emphasised the limited value of 
the evidence to propensity, the age of the convictions, the very different circumstances and 
the limited assistance that the jury would be given by the dishonesty convictions.  Thus, the 
jury would have attached little or no weight to the convictions and there was very strong 
evidence against P. Consequently, P’s conviction was not unsafe. 
COMMENTARY 
The admissibility of evidence of the bad character both of the accused and of persons other 
than the accused is governed by provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Section 99 of 
the 2003 Act abolished the common law rules which had formerly applied in this area (apart 
from a common law rule, preserved by s.118(1), which allows evidence of reputation to be 
admitted to prove bad character). The decision of the House of Lords in Randall was a 
leading case in relation to the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s bad character for a 
co-defendant at common law but as the Court of Appeal indicated in Platt the relevant 
common law principles were abolished by s.99 of the 2003 Act. Thus, in accordance with the 
decision in Platt, it is both unnecessary and probably undesirable to re-examine those 
common law principles further here. Rather, the key is to focus on the principles of the 2003 
Act which now govern the admissibility of evidence of bad character in criminal proceedings. 
Where a co-defendant wishes to adduce evidence of a defendant’s bad character, the 2003 
Act creates three potential gateways. The first is s.101(1)(a), under which evidence of a 
defendant’s bad character is admissible if the parties all agree. The second is s.101(1)(c), a 
gateway available both to the prosecution and to the defence, under which evidence of a 
defendant’s bad character may be admissible as “important explanatory evidence”. The third, 
which was the relevant gateway in Platt, is s.101(1)(e), under which evidence of a 
defendant’s bad character may be admissible for a co-defendant if the evidence has 
substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the defendant 
and the co-defendant. Section 101(1)(e) is supplemented by s.104. Section 104(1) provides 
that evidence of bad character is relevant is only admissible under s.101(1)(e) as evidence of 
a defendant’s propensity to be untruthful if the nature or conduct of the defendant’s defence 
undermines that of the co-defendant who seeks to adduce the bad character evidence. Where 
evidence of a defendant’s bad character is tendered under s.101(1)(e) solely as evidence of 
the defendant’s propensity to commit offences of the kind charged, s.104(1) does not come 
into play (see McLean [2006] 2 Cr App R 4 at [53]). Section 104(2) makes clear that 
evidence of a defendant’s bad character is only admissible under s.101(1)(e)  if adduced by a 
co-defendant or elicited in cross-examination by a co-defendant. Thus, the gateway created 
by s.101(1)(e) is not available to the prosecution.  
As the Court of Appeal in Platt recognised, the key issues that the court must consider when 
determining the admissibility of evidence of bad character under s.101(1)(e)  were elucidated 
by the Court of Appeal in Phillips [2012] 1 Cr App R 25, namely, whether it has substantial 
probative value and whether the matter in relation to which it has substantial probative value 
is one of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole. An important point that 
the Court of Appeal emphasised in Platt is that unlike the situation in which evidence of a 
defendant’s bad character is tendered by the prosecution, once the judge decides that 
evidence of a defendant’s bad character is admissible for a co-defendant under s.101(1)(e) the 
judge does not possess discretion to exclude it. Thus, as the Court of Appeal in Platt 
emphasised, it is important to remember that the admissibility of bad character evidence for a 
co-defendant under s.101(1)(e) is governed by a test which requires “substantial probative 
value”. Conversely, whilst the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s bad character for the 
prosecution under s.101(1)(d) is governed by a simple test of relevance, this is subject to the 
possibility of exclusion in the exercise of the court’s exclusionary discretion under s.101(3). 
The one situation in which the court may be entitled to exclude evidence which would 
otherwise be admissible under s.101(1)(e) is that in which the co-defendant who wishes to 
adduce the evidence has failed to comply with the notice requirements laid down by CrimPR 
Part 21 (see Musone [2007] 2 Cr App R 29 at [56]).  
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